The Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2024, first introduced in November 2023 to replace the Cable Television Networks Act of 1995, aims to grant the Indian government extensive control over news media. It proposes classifying digital content creators as "digital news broadcasters," imposing new regulations across various platforms, from text to videos. The Bill’s updated definitions of "programme" and "broadcasting" include "texts" and "textual programmes," thereby extending its reach to all news-related content on social media, including videos, commentary, websites, newsletters, and podcasts.
The current regulatory mechanism of digital media does not cover OTT (Over the Top) providers , which stream content via internet devices or new-age digital news channels. The explosion of information that the Internet brings in its fold, presents us with problems of misinformation, disinformation, hatemongering on the Internet, and age-appropriateness of content.

The bill also seeks to improve the accessibility of the broadcasting services, as it requires subtitles, audio descriptions, sign language, which is a great development for the disabled. In addition, it increases the production and distribution of local content, thus preserving culture and minority opinions as more people get a chance to be heard. Thus, the proposition of the Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2024, which was introduced in November 2023 may be regarded as an appropriate development of India’s media regulation to protect audience rights and enforce ethical standards, as well as to maintain the adaptability of the media to the telecommunication and societal demands and needs. Having said that, critics argue that the draft of the Bill in its current form is contentious and has serious implications for digital content and content creators

The proposed Broadcast Bill will extend regulation to online streaming services, social media accounts, and video creators worldwide, significantly impacting press and creative freedom. YouTubers, Instagrammers, and TikTok creators with large followings must notify the Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB) within a month of the Bill's passage and register under a three-tier regulatory structure previously applied to streaming services like Amazon Prime Video, Netflix, and Disney+ Hot star (Pahwa. N, 2024b). Creators must establish a content evaluation committee at their own cost to review content before publication. Social media companies failing to provide user information to the government will face criminal liability. News-sharing accounts must register with the government and comply with the regulatory structure within a month, regardless of platform or follower count (Pahwa, 2024a).
The Bill classifies advertising networks as "advertising intermediaries," defining them as entities that facilitate the buying and selling of advertising space on the internet or the placement of ads on online platforms without endorsing the advertisements themselves. This classification excludes advertisers or broadcasters. This regulation affects all ad networks, including Google Ad-sense, Facebook Audience Network, Media.net, Amazon Publisher Services, Flipkart, Outbrain, Taboola, and others.

Major Implications

A YouTube channel or podcast with news commentary that runs ads, or a blog covering news with Google AdSense enabled, will be covered under this Bill. So, you-tubers and Instagrammers who earn from advertising revenue, paid subscriptions, or affiliate activities will be regulated as Digital News Broadcasters if they broadcast news and current affairs. If the Broadcasting Bill becomes law, it risks formalizing censorship of satire, irony, dissent, and uncomfortable truths that may displease the Union government or powerful communities. Given the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting’s history of paternalistic regulation and censorship, the Bill could significantly impact the digital space for both creators and consumers.

Primarily, in the absence of "malice standards," the law risks degrading public debate in India. Malice standard safeguards democratic speech by focusing liability on intentional or reckless falsehoods, while allowing for unintentional errors about public matters. Malice standards, crucial in global jurisprudence, limit liability to those knowingly spreading falsehoods, safeguarding democratic discourse (Allen, 2023). However, the Bill lacks specific "programme codes," only stating that broadcasts must adhere to a future-prescribed "Programme code.”

Secondly, the proposed law is likely to be applied selectively and arbitrarily. In democratic systems, governments favor social groups with political leverage, making it unlikely that this law will target those crucial to the ruling regime. "Programme codes" and certification by the Content Evaluation Committee may be applied differently to supporters and critics, rendering the law predictable for favored groups but inconsistent for dissenters.

Lastly, repressive laws often thrive under unclear and unreliable rules. The Bill raises questions about whether the “programme code” and “advertising code” are for moral and content policing, and whether it has standards for news facticity, analysis, and interviews. It lacks clarity on differentiating critical from malicious content and why written texts are included in broadcast definitions. With no clear answers, enforcement is left to government discretion, threatening free press and public discourse in India. The Bill promotes self-censorship by requiring certification and approval for news, opinions, and creative content, making them more vulnerable to control.

The Bill’s regulations add to a growing list of restrictions—defamation, sedition, anti-terror, and more—that have increasingly curtailed free speech. It acts as an invisible asterisk, limiting what we say based on governmental approval, thereby undermining democracy. More critically, it also stifles the project of decoloniality in India by echoing colonial attitudes. Instead of advancing beyond colonial legacies, the law reflects a belief that citizens are not rational enough for a public sphere and thus need regulation and legal oversight. This approach mimics the colonizer’s mindset, viewing people as too reckless to be trusted with free expression. The draft Bill also mirrors provisions from the IT (Information Technology) Act, including due diligence requirements for regulating online intermediaries, allowing the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to set rules for social media and online advertising, like the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology’s role under the IT Act. Additionally, the Bill includes provisions on piracy, presenting another inconsistency (Pahw, 2024b).

Conclusion

Here the problem is not simply the violation of privacy and censorship, as is the case with many other bills related to broadcasting services, but the issues arising from the Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill 2024 are different and significant in that they will have a chilling effect on independent and small content creators who cannot navigate complicated legal frameworks with ease. Thus, the bill’s categorization of these creators as ‘digital news broadcasters’ with certain compliance requirements could potentially dissuade varied opinions from being voiced. Moreover, data localization poses privacy concerns, logistic and economic challenges for smaller companies while favoring large establishments that can easily meet the requirements.
Additionally, fairness and transparency could be impaired because of arbitrary enforcement of the provisions of the bill. Besides appointment of a single centralizing agency runs the risk of putting too much power in the hands of the ruling elite and will inevitably lead to the suppression of dissident opinions and thus, marginalized groups are likely to have their stories dismissed or sanctioned. It appears from the current scenario that the bill is likely to entrance barriers, reduce media pluralism and endanger democracy and free discourse instead of the proposed aiming at the modernization and unification of the broadcasting sector.

If enacted, the Broadcasting Bill poses a significant risk of institutionalizing censorship, potentially stifling satire, irony, dissent, and inconvenient truths that may challenge the Union government or influential groups. The Bill’s broad regulatory scope, extending to digital content creators and encompassing various forms of media, reflects the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting's history of paternalistic control and censorship. By imposing stringent penalties for non-compliance with ethical codes and government directives, the Bill threatens to undermine journalistic freedom and restrict access to a diverse range of viewpoints. The high fines and rigorous enforcement measures outlined in the draft Bill could lead to self-censorship and a reduction in the variety of perspectives available to the public. The potential for such widespread impact underscores the need for careful consideration of the Bill’s implications on free expression and democratic discourse. In conclusion, the Bill’s provisions raise serious concerns about its effects on media freedom and the broader democratic principle of open dialogue.

References

Allen, J. (2023). Defamation and Democracy: The Democracy Case for Preserving the “Actual Malice” Standard. Protect Democracy. https://protectdemocracy.org/work/democracy-case-actual-malice/

Pahwa, N. (2024a). India’s New Broadcast Bill now has Compliance Requirements for YouTubers and Instagrammers. MEDIANAMA. https://www.medianama.com/2024/07/223-india-broadcast-bill-online-creators/

Pahwa, N. (2024b). How India’s Broadcast Bill will muzzle content creators. Scroll.in. https://scroll.in/article/1071413/how-indias-broadcast-bill-will-muzzle-content-creators

Ashish Sharma is an Associate Professor in the Presidency School of Media Studies, Presidency University Bangalore, India. Varsha Sisodia is an Assistant Professor in the Times School of Media, Bennett University, Noida, India. 

Photo by Dusan Veverkologon via Unsplash